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1. Introduction 
Ethics in relation to the practice of medicine had continuity from the time of Hippocrates 
(ca. 460-377 BC) to the 1970s focusing on the physician-patient relationship and moral 
obligations of beneficence and nonmaleficence. In the 1970s developments such as the gene 
splicing method and in vitro fertilization (IVF) created concerns about the adequacy of these 
long-established moral obligations (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 1). In addition to 
technological developments, historically, horrifying medical experimentation in 
concentration camps (the Nuremberg trials in the late 1940s) and the following Helsinki 
Declaration on the protection of human subjects had influence on the establishment of ethics 
committees worldwide and a shift toward focusing on the moral obligation of respecting 
informed consent of research subjects (Andersen, 1999, pp. 11-15; Beauchamp & Childress, 
2009, pp. 1, 117; Ebbesen, 2009).  
The discipline of bioethics or biomedical ethics1 was established in the 1970s and various 
professions are involved such as ethics consultants, health care professionals, medical 
doctors, biomedical researchers, philosophers, theologians, and politicians. This essay, 
however, focuses on bioethics as an academic philosophical discipline and on empirical 
investigation of the ethics of the biomedical profession (Ebbesen, 2009). 
Most research within the academic philosophical discipline of bioethics focus on theoretical 
reflections on the adequacy of ethical theories and principles. The principles of biomedical 
ethics of the American ethicists Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress (2009) is an 
example. Beauchamp & Childress examined “considered moral judgements and the way 
moral beliefs cohere” and found that the general principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, 
respect for autonomy, and justice play a vital role in biomedical ethics (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009, p. 13). They believe that these principles are an analytical framework and a 
suitable starting point for biomedical ethics (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 12). However, 
Beauchamp & Childress state that these four principles are not only specific for biomedical 
ethics; the principles form the core part of a cross cultural (universal) common morality. 
Beauchamp & Childress appeal to the common morality normatively by saying that the 
common morality establishes moral standards for everyone and failing to accept these 
standards is unethical. And, they appeal to the common morality descriptively by saying 
that it can be studied empirically whether the common morality is actually present in all 
cultures (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 4). 
                                                 
1 In this essay the concepts of bioethics and biomedical ethics are used interchangeable to describe the 
analysis and discussion of ethical problems of biomedicine.  
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There is debate on whether the principles and method of Beauchamp & Childress are 
specific American and whether they can be used outside America, for instance in Europe 
and Asia. This essay examines these issues by introducing the theory of Beauchamp & 
Childress, by reviewing a Danish empirical study where Danish oncologists and Danish 
molecular biologists were interviewed, and lastly by outlining future perspective for 
broader empirical studies.  
2. The common morality 
Beauchamp believes that people from different cultures share some moral rules in common. 
These moral rules are for instance “Tell the truth”, “Do not kill”, “Rescue persons who are in 
danger”, and “Do not steal”. These moral rules are not implemented the same way in all 
cultures, however, the norms themselves are cross cultural. According to Beauchamp, these 
rules are justified by more abstract general principles. There is a transparent connection 
between these rules and the more general principles. For example the moral rule of “Tell the 
truth” is justified by the general principle of respect for autonomy, the rule “Do not kill” is 
justified by the principle of nonmaleficence, the rule “Rescue persons who are in danger” is 
justified by the principle of beneficence, and lastly, the moral rule “Do not steal” is justified 
by the principle of justice. One rule can be justified by more than one principle; hence there 
is a non-linear connection between rules and principles. This shared, universal system of 
rules and principles constitutes what Beauchamp calls moral in the narrow sense or the 
common morality (Beauchamp, 1997, p. 26). He defines the common morality as “the set of 
norms shared by all persons committed to the objectives of morality. The objectives of 
morality, I will argue, are those of promoting human flourishing by counteracting 
conditions that cause the quality of people’s lives to worsen” (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 260). 
Beauchamp is aware that not everybody accepts or lives up to the demands of the common 
morality. This is not because these persons have a different morality; it is simply because 
they are immoral.  Hence, the common morality is not just a morality that differs from other 
moralities (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 260). The common morality is “applicable to all persons in 
all places, and all human conduct is rightly judged by its standards” (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 
260). Hence, the common morality provides an objective basis for moral judgment. 
The moral rules and principles of the common morality are often so unspecific and content-
thin that they only provide a basic guideline or orientation for addressing specific moral 
problems, for instance as to whether treatment without patient content is a moral acceptable 
enterprise (Beauchamp, 1997, p. 27).  Practical moral problems of this kind require that the 
unspecific content-thin rules and principles of the common morality are made specific and 
implemented. Since answers to practical moral problems and the balancing of different values 
do often vary from one culture to another, specification and implementation of norms and 
principles are often done in different ways in different cultures. The universal system of rules 
and principles of the common morality does then form the basis or the starting point for  
this implementation (Beauchamp, 1997, p. 27-28). Beauchamp does not ignore that moral 
decision-making and practices vary from one culture to another, but they do not vary so much 
that the common morality is called into question. This plurality of moral decision-making and 
moral practices constitutes what Beauchamp calls moral in the broad sense introducing the 
concept of moral differences (Beauchamp, 1997, p. 27). Beauchamp believes that while the 
common morality or morality in the narrow sense “contains only general moral standards that 
are conspicuously abstract, universal, and content-thin” morality in the broad sense presents 
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“concrete, nonuniversal, and content-rich norms” (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 261). Morality in the 
broad sense implements “the many responsibilities, aspirations, idealism, attitudes, and 
sensitivities that spring from cultural traditions, religious traditions, professional practice, 
institutional rules and the like” (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 261). Hence, Beauchamp argues that 
multiculturalism is not in opposition to universal ethical principles and he defends 
multiculturalism as a form of universalism (personal communication). 
3. The four basic principles of the common morality 
Beauchamp defends a moral framework of four clusters of moral principles which form the 
core part of the common morality. These four principles are: respect for autonomy 
(respecting the decision-making capacities of autonomous persons), nonmaleficence 
(avoiding the causation of harm), beneficence (providing benefits and balancing benefits, 
burdens, and risks), and justice (fairness in the distribution of benefits and risks). To 
interpret a principle is to tell what the principle is about and Beauchamp argues that the 
four principles are interpreted differently in different cultures. In figure 1 the four basic 
principles of the common morality are presented.  
 
 
Fig. 1. The four basic principles of the common morality. A brief formulation of the four 
ethical principles: respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Ebbesen, 2009).  
Respect for autonomy
• “As a negative obligation: Autonomous actions should not be subjected to controlling 
constraints by others” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 104). 
• “As a positive obligation, this principle requires both respectful treatment in disclosing 
information and actions that foster autonomous decision making” (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2009, p. 104). Furthermore, this principle obligates to “disclose information, to probe for and 
ensure understanding and voluntariness, and to foster adequate decision making” 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 104). 
The Principle of Beneficence 
• One ought to prevent and remove evil or harm  
• One ought to do and promote good (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 151). 
The Principle of Nonmaleficence 
• “One ought not to inflict evil or harm”, where harm is understood as “thwarting, defeating, or 
setting back some party’s interests” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, pp. 151-152). 
The Principle of justice 
Beauchamp & Childress do not think that a single principle can address all problems of distributive 
justice (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 241).  They defend a framework for allocation that 
incorporates both utilitarian and egalitarian standards. A fair health care system includes two 
strategies for health care allocation: 1) a utilitarian approach stressing maximal benefit to patients 
and society, and 2) an egalitarian strategy emphasising the equal worth of persons and fair 
opportunity (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, pp. 275, 281). 
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4. Managing complex cases of biomedicine 
The four ethical principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice 
can be used when managing complex or problematic cases of biomedicine. When the 
principles are used in biomedicine it is often necessary to make the principles specific for 
that actual case. A specification of a principle is to narrow its scope and making it action-
guiding. Beauchamp & Childress explain specification as “a process of reducing the 
indeterminate character of abstract norms and generating more specific, action-guiding 
content” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 17). Specification involves a fine-tuning of the 
range and scope of the principle by increasing information about that specific situation 
(what time, where, what persons are involved, and so forth). Each principle is prima facie 
binding, which means that it “must be fulfilled unless it conflicts, on a particular occasion, 
with an equal or stronger obligation” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p.15). If principles 
conflict they can be justifiably overridden which is the act of balancing (meaning that none 
of the principles are absolute). Balancing principles tells about their weight and strength, 
when balancing two principles, one principle is infringed by another (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009, pp. 19-20). Beauchamp & Childress list six conditions that must be met to 
justify the infringement of one prima facie principle by another (figure 2). Beauchamp & 
Childress state that physicians’ acts of balancing and specifying ethical principles often 
involve “sympathetic insight, humane responsiveness, and the practical wisdom of 
evaluating a particular patient’s circumstance and needs” (Beauchamp & Childress,  
2009, p. 22). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Conditions constraining balancing. Conditions that must be met to justify 
infringement of one prima facie norm in order to adhere to another (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009; Ebbesen, 2009). 
5. Empirical justification of the common morality 
The Danish physician and philosopher Soeren Holm states that the four principles of 
Beauchamp & Childress are developed from American common morality and that they 
reflect certain aspects of American society and therefore they are limited to America and 
unsuited for Europe (Holm, 1997). Two Danish ethicists Jacob Rendtorff and Peter Kemp 
present a European alternative to Beauchamp & Childress’ principles. Rendtorff & Kemp 
state that there are four ethical principles specifically suited for managing problematic cases 
of biomedicine in Europe, namely the principles of autonomy, dignity, integrity, and 
 
1. “Good reasons can be offered to act on the overriding norm rather than on the infringed 
norm”. 
2. “The moral objective justifying the infringement has a realistic prospect of achievement”. 
3. “No morally preferable alternative actions are available”. 
4. “The lowest level of infringement, commensurate with achieving the primary goal of the 
action, has been selected”. 
5. “Any negative effects of the infringement have been minimized” 
6. “All affected parties have been treated impartially” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 23). 
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vulnerability (Rendtorff & Kemp, 2000). However, I believe that ethical principles always do 
contain obligations such as ‘you ought to respect …’. What Rendtorff & Kemp call principles 
do not contain obligations. Hence, strictly speaking, they cannot be considered as principles 
but as ethical concepts which can be reformulated into ethical principles. This can be done 
the following way: ‘Respect for autonomy’, Respect for dignity’, and so forth. Beauchamp 
does also argue that the so-called principles of Rendtorff & Kemp are not principles at all. 
For instance, Beauchamp considers integrity is a virtue and vulnerability as a property or 
condition of persons. Furthermore, he thinks that the concept of dignity is one of the most 
obscure concepts of bioethics, since nobody knows what dignity is. Moreover, as can be seen 
above, Beauchamp does not believe in specific European ethical principles (personal 
communication).   
Beauchamp states that empirical research could prove him (or Rendtorff & Kemp) wrong. 
The hypothesis to be tested is that all persons committed to the objective of morality adhere 
to the common morality (and thereby to the four ethical principles, which form the basis of 
the common morality) (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 264). First, persons should be screened to test 
whether they are committed to the objectives of morality (which “are those of promoting 
human flourishing by counteracting conditions that cause the quality of people’s lives to 
worsen” (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 260)). Persons not committed to morality should then be 
excluded from the study. Next, it should be tested “whether cultural or individual 
differences emerge over the (most general) norms believed to achieve best the objectives of 
morality” (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 264). Beauchamp writes: “Should it turn out that the 
individuals or cultures studied do not share the norms that I hypothesize to comprise the 
common morality, then there is no common morality of the sort I claim and my particular 
hypothesis has been falsified” (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 264).  
If it turns out that other general norms than the ones proposed by Beauchamp are shared 
across cultures, then the empirical study proves the presence of a common morality, 
however, of another sort than the one proposed by Beauchamp. Such an empirical study 
does not tell whether the norms of the common morality are adequate or in need of change. 
This is a normative question and not an empirical one (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 265). 
Beauchamp appeals to the common morality in both normative and nonnormative ways. 
The common morality has normative force meaning that it sets up moral standards for 
everyone and failing to accept these standards is unethical. Nonnormatively, Beauchamp 
claims that it can be studied empirically whether the common morality is present in all 
cultures.  So, claims about the existence of the common morality can be justified empirically 
and analysis of the adequacy of the common morality involves normative investigation 
(Beauchamp, 2003, p. 265).  
6. A Danish empirical study 
One of the aims of a Danish empirical study where oncologists and molecular biologists 
were interviewed was to test whether there is a difference in the ethical considerations or 
principles at stake between the two groups. Since this study explores part of Beauchamp’s 
hypothesis, he followed this study personally. This study was based on 12 semi-structured 
interviews with three groups of respondents: a group of oncology physicians working in a 
clinic at a public hospital and two groups of molecular biologists conducting basic research, 
one group employed at a public university and the other in private biotechnological 
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company. The interview texts were transcribed word-for-word and analysed using a 
phenomenological hermeneutical method for interpreting interview texts inspired by the 
theory of interpretation presented by the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. There were three 
steps in the data analysis. First, the texts were read several times in order to grasp their 
meaning as a whole. Next, themes were formulated across the whole interview material. 
And lastly, the themes were reflected on in relation to the literature which helped to  
revise, widen, and deepen the understanding of the texts (Ricoeur, 1976; Ebbesen & 
Pedersen 2007a). 
The results of the study are summarised shortly. This empirical study indicated that 
oncology physicians and molecular biologists employed in a private biopharmaceutical 
company had the specific principle of beneficence in mind in their daily work. Both groups 
seemed motivated to help sick patients. According to the study, molecular biologists 
explicitly considered nonmaleficence in relation to the environment, the researchers’ own 
health, and animal models; and only implicitly in relation to patients or human subjects. In 
contrast, considerations of nonmaleficence by oncology physicians related to patients or 
human subjects. Physicians and molecular biologists both considered the principle of 
respect for autonomy as a negative obligation in the sense that informed consent of patients 
should be respected. Molecular biologists stressed that very sick patients might be 
constrained by the circumstances to make a certain choice. However, in contrast to 
molecular biologists, physicians experienced the principle of respect for autonomy as a 
positive obligation because the physician, in dialogue with the patient, offers a medical 
prognosis evaluation based upon the patients’ wishes and ideas, mutual understanding, and 
respect. Finally, this study disclosed a utilitarian element in the concept of justice as 
experienced by molecular biologists from the private biopharmaceutical company and 
egalitarian and utilitarian characteristics in the overall conception of justice as conceived by 
oncology physicians. Molecular biologists employed at a public university were, in this 
study, concerned with just allocation of resources; however, they did not support a specific 
theory of justice (Ebbesen & Pedersen 2007b, 2008a, 2008b). 
This study showed that the ethical principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, 
nonmaleficence, and justice as formulated by Beauchamp & Childress were related to the 
ethical reflections of the Danish oncology physicians and the Danish molecular biologists, 
and hence that they are important for Danish biomedical practice. Apparently, no empirical 
studies have investigated specifically the importance of the four principles previously; 
therefore, this empirical study contributes to an enhanced understanding of Beauchamp & 
Childress’ theory from a new point of view. It could be objected, however, that the study 
did not centre on respondents who had already been screened to assure that they are 
morally committed, as Beauchamp recommend. According to Beauchamp, a way of 
screening whether persons are committed to morality is to test whether they are committed 
to the principle of nonmaleficence since this principle can be seen as the most basic principle 
of morality (personal communication). All respondents included in the study valued 
nonmaleficient behaviour.   
7. Perspectives 
Beauchamp & Childress believe that their four basic ethical principles are included in the 
cross-cultural common morality (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). However, as described 
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above, some of Beauchamp & Childress’ opponents state that their theory has been 
developed from the American common morality and that it reflects certain characteristics of 
American society. Therefore, the theory might not be useful in other societies. Nevertheless, 
the results of the Danish empirical study demonstrate that the theory is related to Danish 
biomedical practice.  
Future perspectives of the Danish empirical study are to explore whether Beauchamp & 
Childress’ principles are cross-cultural and thereby have a universal perspective. This could 
be done by investigating whether there is a difference in the ethical considerations and 
principles at stake between physician oncologists working in different cultural settings  
(e.g. Scandinavian, Southern European, Asian, and American cultures). For instance, in 
Japan the principle of respect for autonomy is said to be more family oriented than in 
America (Fan, 1997). What is needed is a qualitative investigation of Japanese culture. This 
future study might show that Beauchamp & Childress’ principles need reformulation to be 
used in specific cultural settings. 
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